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LEGISLATION-WITNEss IMMUNITY AcT OF 1954-CoNsTITU-
TIONAL AND INTERPRETATIVE PROBLEMS-The passage in August, 
1954 of a federal statute1 granting immunity under specified condi-
tions to witnesses before congressional committees and in the federal 
courts marks a third legislative experiment designed to soften the effect 
of the Fifth Amendment as a limitation on the investigatory power of 
Congress. The first two attempts2 were less than successful. This 
comment will discuss the historical background of immunity legisla-
tion, and some possible constitutional pitfalls and problems of con-
struction created by the statutory language. 
I. The Historical Perspective 
In ruling on what was essentially a question of common-law privi-
lege in United States v. Burr,8 Chief Justice John Marshall laid down 
some fundamental conditions of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion which remain good law today. He stated, inter alia, that a witness 
might properly claim this privilege where his testimony would furnish 
1 18 U.S.C.A (Cum. Supp. 1954) §3486. 
211 Stat. L. 156 (1857); 12 Stat. L. 333 (1862). 
s (C.C. Va. 1807) 25 Fed. Cas. 2, No. 14,692a-14,694a. 
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a link in the chain of testimony which might lead to his conviction for 
a crime. As late as 1951, Marshall's statement of the law was relied 
upon in a decision making a refusal to answer questions concerning 
communist affiliation a proper one under the Fifth Amendment.4 
Subsequent cases have added a number of propositions to Marshall's 
fairly broad definition of the scope of the privilege. These propositions, 
stated with more finality than should necessarily be ascribed to them, 
are: (I) The testimony need not be demanded during the trial of an 
actual criminal case, but testimony in any form, if compellable, is 
within the scope of the protection.5 (2) The testimony sought must 
have a tendency to incriminate and not merely to disgrace.6 (3) The 
privilege may be waived voluntarily or may be made meaningless by 
a previous pardon, or running of the statute of limitations.7 ( 4) The 
privilege must be specifically invoked or it will be deemed waived.8 
(5) The privilege extends to forced disclosure of evidence in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution,9 thereby laying a basis 
for a theory of mutuality of the two provisions.10 (6) The privilege 
cannot be invoked on the ground that the witness might be prosecuted 
in a separate sovereignty.11 As a corollary to these principles, it should 
be noted that the privilege was not incorporated in the Fourteenth 
Amendment so as to apply to state governmental action, though nearly 
every state has such a provision in its own constitution.12 
With these doctrines as background, the legislative substitutes for 
the privilege may now be considered. Congress' first major experi-
ment with an immunity statute came in 1857, when a statute giving 
immunity from prosecution to all witnesses appearing before congres-
sional committees was passed under circumstances indicating hasty con-
sideration.13 Under this statute, which contained no procedural safe-
4Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 71 S.Ct. 223 (1950). 
5 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 at 562, 12 S.Ct. 195 (1892). 
6 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 at 598, 16 S.Ct. 644 (1896). For historical 
perspective, see Corwin, "The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination 
Clause," 29 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1930). 
7Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 at 597 et seq., 16 S.Ct. 644 (1896). 
BRogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 438 (1951). 
OBoyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524 (1886). 
10 See, e.g., Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 64 S.Ct. 1082 (1944), esp. 
Black, J., dissenting. 
11 United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 52 S.Ct. 63 (1931); Jack v. Kansas, 199 
U.S. 372, 26 S.Ct. 73 (1905). 
12 See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14 (1908). For a recent case 
on state immunity legislation, see State v. Abdella, (W.Va. 1954) 82 S.E. (2d) 913. 
13 The catalyst for the proposal of the bill was the refusal of a newspaper correspond-
ent, Simonton, to answer questions about alleged bribery of members of Congress by 
unnamed persons. He did not claim any privilege against self-incrimination, but rather 
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guards against "immunity baths," a number of persons escaped prosecu-
tion for serious crimes, while the committees which heard their testi-
mony gained no corresponding enlightenment.14 
In 1862, the act of 1857 was amended by unanimous vote to limit 
immunity to the use of testimony given by a witness.15 This second 
experiment with immunity legislation did not, strictly speaking, pro-
vide immunity at all. Rather, it prohibited the introduction of a 
witness' testimony against him in a criminal trial, or use of it therein.16 
The statute was held (by implication) to be an incomplete substitute 
for the constitutional privilege when similar legislation applicable to 
grand jury proceedings was tested in Counselman v. Hitchcock.11 
The Supreme Court held that the statute did not provide as broad an 
immunity as is necessary to protect a witness' constitutional rights 
under the self-incrimination clause. This statute protected the witness 
only from the use of his testimony in a direct manner, whereas the 
Constitution protected him from any disclosure which might provide 
a part of the evidence leading to his conviction. The Court gave the 
cue for further legislation, however, saying, "It is quite clear that legis-
lation cannot abridge a constitutional privilege, and that it cannot re-
place or supply one, unless it is so broad as to have the same extent in 
scope and effect. ... "18 Congress took the cue and applied it the next 
year in an amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act.19 Substantially 
the same provision was included in subsequent legislation creating and 
governing other federal regulatory bodies.2O 
Thus began the third era of immunity legislation. The provision 
in the Interstate Commerce Act was upheld by the Supreme Court in 
1896 by a bare 5-4 decision in the case of Brown v. Walker.21 The 
rationale of the majority stemmed principally from the dictum in the 
Counselman case and was bolstered by this policy consideration: 
"The danger of extending the principle announced in Counsel-
man v. Hitchcock is that the privilege may be put forward for a 
refused to divulge names because of purely moral considerations of personal confidence. 
The bill was passed by an almost unanimous vote after but two days debate in both houses. 
See CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d sess., pp. 403-445 (1857). 
14 CoNG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d sess., p. 428 (1862). 
15 Id. at 431. 
10 12 Stat. L. 333 (1862). 
11142 U.S. 547, 12 S.Ct. 195 (1892). 
18 Id. at 585. 
19 27 Stat. L. 443 (1893). 
20 See discussion by Frankfurter, J., in his dissent to United States v. Monia, 317 
U.S. 424 at 436, 63 S.Ct. 409 (1943). 
21161 U.S. 591, 16 S.Ct. 644 (1896). 
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sentimental reason, or for a purely fanciful protection of the wit-
ness against an imaginary danger, and for the real purpose of secur-
ing immunity to some third person, who is interested in conceal-
ing the facts to which he would testify. Every good citizen is 
bound to aid in the enforcement of the law, and has no right to 
permit himself, under the pretext of shielding his own good name, 
to be made the tool of others, who are desirous of seeking shelter 
behind his privilege. "22 
The Court suggested that the supremacy clause of the Constitution 
would prevent the use of the witness' testimony in state prosecutions. 
The minority argued that no statute could limit a constitutional privi-
lege should the witness choose the privilege and not the statute. Justice 
Field suggested that the amendment was intended to protect a witness 
from revealing his past actions in such a way as to disgrace him. 23 The 
minority also urged further objections: the possibility of prosecutions 
in state courts was not foreclosed by the statute, and the act usurped 
the presidential prerogative to grant pardons. 24 
There remained some interpretative problems regarding the im-
munity provisions in statutes similar to the Interstate Commerce Act. 
One of significance to the present inquiry arose in 1942 in the case of 
United States v. Monia.25 The case involved this problem: when a 
person in obedience to a subpoena appears before a grand jury investi-
gating alleged violations of the Sherman Act and gives testimony sub-
stantially touching an offense for which he is later prosecuted, does he 
obtain immunity from that prosecution without having claimed his 
privilege under the Fifth Amendment before so testifying? The Court 
held that the defendant, Mania, was immune, the statute being clear 
that after subpoena and oath, the testimony in and of itself would 
raise the umbrella of immunity. The effect of the Interstate Com-
merce Act was distinguished from some of the New Deal regulatory 
legislation which included specific provisions limiting immunity to 
those cases in which the witness claimed the privilege before testify-
ing. 26 Justice Frankfurter dissented on the ground that the ultimate 
purpose of immunity provisions in all of the regulatory acts was not to 
grant amnesty, but to aid in the enforcement of the criminal law. He 
22 Id. at 600. 
23 Id. at 631. 
24 Id. at 610, 622. 
25 317 U.S. 424, 63 S.Ct. 409 (1943). 
26 Id. at 429. 
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pointed out that in three of the New Deal statutes27 the immunity 
grant was substantially in the terms of the former provisions (including 
the Sherman Act provision), thus negating any specific purpose to 
differentiate among them in regard to the procedural prerequisites for 
immunity.28 
In summary, then, the type of immunity provision appended to 
various federal regulatory statutes was held to be a sufficient protec-
tion for the person testifying. This was true whether or not he was 
required to claim his privilege before being granted immunity. The 
importance of decisions under these statutes becomes evident when 
their language is compared with the 1954 act. 
Fonner §3486 of Title 18, United States Code, the lineal descend-
ant of the 1857 and 1862 acts relating to testimony before congres-
sional committees, remains in the historical background of the 1954 
legislation. Under this statute (repealed by the 1954 act), testimony 
given by a witness before a committee could not be used in subsequent 
prosecutions "in any court." In Adams 11. Maryland29 it was decided 
that by force of the phrase "in any court," a state could not introduce 
in a state prosecution the testimony of a person given before a congres-
sional committee. The theory of this result was logically outlined as 
follows: Congress has power to summon witnesses; the necessary and 
proper clause of the Constitution gives Congress power to pass laws 
which will effectuate that power; the supremacy clause of the Consti-
tution makes the statutory exercise of the power binding on state courts 
so as to prevent the admission of testimony protected by the federal 
statute. It should be noted that the Court's decision was based upon 
the language of the statute involved. The Fifth Amendment does not 
require the same result as to state prosecutions. 30 
Beginning with the frequent invocation of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege before committees inquiring into matters of security and loy-
alty, a c;onsiderable amount of dissatisfaction with such use began to 
appear in Congress. In January of 1953, Senator McCarran introduced 
S. 16.31 In its original form, this bill would, upon an affirmative vote 
27Motor Carrier Act, 49 Stat. L. 550 (1935); Industrial Alcohol Act, 49 Stat. L. 875 
(1935); Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. L. 1065 (1938). 
28 ''To attnoute caprice to Congress is not to respect its rational purpose when, as here, 
we find a uniform policy deeply rooted in history even though variously phrased but 
always directed to the same end of meeting the constitutional requirement." Frankfurter, 
J., in United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 at 446, 63 S.Ct. 409 (1943). 
29 347 U.S. 179, 74 S.Ct. 442 (1954). 
30 See Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372, 26 S.Ct. 73 (1905). 
31 See H. Rep. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (1954); 99 CoNG. Rec. 265 (1953), for 
the substance and permutations of this bill. 
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of two-thirds of a committee, have immunized the witness from crim-
inal prosecution on any relevant matters about which he gave testi-
mony. No provision was made for extending immunity to witnesses 
testifying in judicial proceedings. It did not provide that the attorney 
general be apprised of the proposed grant of immunity, nor for a court 
order preceding effectuation of the grant. A later amendment by Sena-
tor McCarran provided for notice to the attorney general. 
The administration, represented by the attorney general, was not 
satisfied with the McCarran bill and approved an alternative proposal 
introduced in the House as H.R. 6899 by Representative Keating in 
January of 1954.32 This bill was broader in scope than S. 16, in that 
it extended the immunity provision to judicial proceedings. In addi-
tion, it provided that immunity could not be granted in congressional 
proceedings without the assent of the attorney general. This bill did 
not contain any provision requiring court approval of the grant. 
The bill finally enacted into law was a substitute version drafted 
by the House Judiciary Committee. It combined features of the two 
major proposals outlined above but contained some unique provisions. 
Instead of committee approval alone, or committee approval plus the 
assent of the attorney general, the latter official was relegated essen-
tially to an advisory position, while court approval of the committee's 
recommendation of immunity was required. Instead of a broad provi-
sion relating to witnesses' testimony on any matter, the immunity could 
be granted only as to testimony relating to certain criminal acts against 
the national defense and security.33 In addition to so limiting the scope 
of the statute, Congress also eliminated the restricted testimonial im-
munity which had been provided by former §3486. The important 
portions of the 1954 Witness Immunity Act are set forth below.34 
S2 See H. Rep. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (1954); H. Hearings before Subcommittee 
No. 1 0£ the Committee on Judiciary on Internal Security Legislation, 83d Cong., 2d sess., 
p. 149 (1954) (brief 0£ the attorney general). 
83 Included in the scope of immunity grantable by a congressional committee: " .•• any 
interference with or endangering of, or any plans or attempts to interfere with or endanger 
the national security or defense of the United States by treason, sabotage, espionage, sedi-
tion, seditious conspiracy or the overthrow of its Government by force or violence. • • ." 
18 U.S.C.A. (Cum. Supp. 1954) §3486. 
34 After providing that no witness shall be excused £rom testifying or producing 
evidence before a committee (or either House, or a joint committee) on the ground that 
the testimony or evidence may tend to incriminate him, subsection (a)(2) describes the 
conditions under which such excuse shall be ineffective in proceedings before a committee: 
" ••• that two-thirds of the members of the full committee shall by affirmative vote have 
authorized such witness to be granted immunity under this section with respect to the 
transactions, matters, or things concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed 
his privilege against sel£-incrimination to testify or produce evidence by direction of the 
presiding officer and that an order of the United States district court for the district wherein 
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II. Constitutional Problems 
In the attorney general's brief submitted to the House Judiciary 
Committee the supposition is made that no constitutional problems of 
any magnitude are raised by the immunity bill endorsed by him, i.e., 
H.R. 6899.35 This supposition appears to be a sound one in view of 
the decisions construing former immunity legislation. Although other 
grounds of attack may be proposed, it is believed that attention will 
center principally on the separation of powers in the national govern-
ment, the distinction in fundamental purpose between committee in-
vestigations and those of regulatory agencies, the reasonableness of the 
procedure set up as a substitute for the Fifth Amendment, and the 
argument based upon the usurpation of the executive pardoning power. 
A. Separation of Powers. The doctrine of separation of powers 
appears to be the most serious ground of attack on the statute.36 It will 
be seen that the power of Congress to endow courts with something 
like administrative duties ( under the necessary and proper clause) is 
the inquiry is being carried on has been entered into the record requiring such person to 
testify or produce evidence. Such an order may be issued by a United States district court 
judge upon application by a duly authorized representative of the Congress or of the 
committee concerned. But no such witness shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty 
or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is 
so compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or 
produce evidence, nor shall testimony so compelled be used as evidence in any criminal 
proceedings (except prosecutions described in subsection (d) hereof) against him in any 
court." Prosecutions under subsection (d) here referred to are for contempt or perjury. 
Subsection (b) provides: ''Neither house nor any committee thereof nor any joint 
committee of the two Houses of Congress shall grant immunity to any witness without 
first having notified the Attorney General of the United States of such action and there-
after having secured the approval of the United States district court for the district wherein 
such inquiry is being held. The Attorney General of the United States shall be notified 
of the time of each proposed application to the United States district court and shall be 
given the opportunity to be heard with respect thereto prior to the entrance into the record 
of the order of the district court." 
Subsection (c) provides for a similar grant of immunity in "any case or proceeding 
before any grand jury or court of the United States" on application to the court by the 
United States attorney and with the approval of the attorney general. The areas in which 
such immunity grant may be made, in addition to those enumerated in subsection (a), 
include several specific statutes relating to internal security. The requirement is also in-
cluded that the testimony be in the judgment of the United States attorney "in the public 
interest." A substantive grant of immunity is provided similar to that of subsection (a). 
35 See H. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1 of the Committee on Judiciary on 
Internal Security Legislation, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 149 (1954). 
36 One aspect of this objection not set forth herein was touched upon by Senators 
Lehman and Cooper in debate on the original S. 16. Their attack centered on a theory 
that the executive power to administer the criminal law would be obstructed by congres-
sional assumption of power to grant witnesses immunity in particular instances. See 99 
CoNG. REc. 8342, 8351 (1953). But since such agencies as the Interstate Commerce 
Commission are not purely executive, and since they do not administer the criminal law 
per se, query as to the force of this argument. 
1955] CoMMENTS 865 
at least theoretically at odds with the idea that the executive, legislative, 
and judicial functions are separate and that each of these functions is 
exercisable only by the department created for this purpose by the 
Constitution.37 The usual situation where the separation of powers 
question has arisen is in the exercise of so-called quasi-legislative pow-
ers by administrative agencies or by the President. It has generally 
been held that the exercise of such powers is constitutional if reason-
ably limited by legislative criteria and necessary to the effectuation of 
the legislative purpose. 38 The present problem seldom arises in the 
operation of the national government, but it appears that exercise of 
administrative powers by a federal district court is not wholly invalid.39 
Where it is sought, however, to invest such a court with power to 
adjudicate when there is no case or controversy, a contrary result is 
reached because of the plain words of article III.4° The instant statute, 
in succeeding subsections, seems to present the judiciary with an ad-
mixture of administrative and judicial functions. Under subsection 
(a), no witness shall be excused from testifying after a recommendation 
by a two-thirds vote of a committee that he be granted immunity, pro-
vided the record shows "that an order of the United States district 
court for the district wherein the inquiry is being carried on has been 
entered into the record requiring said person to testify or produce evi-
dence." In subsection (b), it is prescribed that neither the House nor 
any committee "shall grant immunity to any witness without first .. . 
having secured the approval of the United States district court .... " 
The substance of these two provisions appears to be in conflict. The 
first seems to require the court to decide the rights of the witness 
( whether he shall be compelled to testify notwithstanding his privi-
lege); the second may require the court to determine only the propriety 
of a grant of immunity. If two different qualities of acts are contem-
plated by the two subsections-and this is arguable as a matter of in-
S7THE FEDERALIST, Nos. 47-51. Cf. Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. (2 U.S.) 408 (1792), 
and note thereto. 
38 Compare Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 S.Ct. 495 (1892), where the necessary 
limiting criteria were held to be present, with Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 
55 S.Ct. 241 (1935), where they were held not to be present. 
39 See 34 CoL. L. REv. 344 (1934); Katz, "Federal Legislative Courts,'' 43 HARv. L. 
REv. 894 (1930). In Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 31 S.Ct. 250 (1911), 
the Supreme Court instructed the Court of Claims to dismiss the petition for want of 
jurisdiction, on the basis that there was no case or controversy presented, a necessary ele-
ment to exercise of the judicial power under article III of the Constitution. Since the 
Court of Claims is a ''legislative" court, query whether there was necessarily a want of 
jurisdiction in that tribunal. Cf. Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1 at 13, 14, 65 S.Ct. 16 
(1944) as to the dual nature of the Court of Claims. 
40 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 31 S.Ct. 250 (19II). 
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terpretation-the element of "approval" in the second subsection will 
in effect condition the outcome under the first subsection. If the act 
is viewed in these terms, subsection (a) seems to contemplate a judicial 
proceeding with the requisite adversity of parties (on questions of 
materiality of the inquiry, procedural steps, etc.), while subsection (b) 
seems to require what is in the nature of an administrative act. It is 
doubtful that a witness would have standing to object to the approval 
of a grant of immunity for himself. Although appeal from the district 
court's decision seems to have been assumed in the debate on the en-
acted bill,41 Supreme Court review of a decision relative to the wisdom 
of a proposed immunity grant may be foreclosed by the Muskrat case.42 
It is debatable at any rate whether any discretionary act is to be per-
formed. by the court under the terms of the statute. This problem will 
be touched upon in section III below. 
B. Distinction Between Purposes of Congressional Committees 
and Regulatory Agencies. An argument based upon the distinction in 
purpose between congressional committees and regulatory agencies 
would seem to have little weight. Granted that a congressional body 
is not charged with administering the criminal law and that its need 
for an immunity statute may thus be smaller, still the courts place little 
limit on the investigating power, and any statute which serves to ad-
vance that function within the limits of the Constitution is likely to be 
held valid.43 There is some force in the argument, however, when the 
somewhat grudging decision in Brown v. Walker is considered. If the 
rationale of the constitutionality of immunity statutes lies in a public 
policy aimed at eliminating obstructions to enforcement of criminal · 
justice, which can outweigh the irregularity of substituting a statute 
for a constitutional provision, it may be said that in the case of congres-
sional investigations that policy is not so clearly served.44 
41 See 100 CoNG. REc. 12602 et seq. (Aug. 4, 1954). 
42 " ••• If such actions as are here attempted, to determine the validity of legislation, 
are sustained, the result will be that this court, instead of keeping within the limits of 
judicial power and deciding cases and controversies arising between opposing parties, as 
the Constitution intended it should, will be required to give opinions in the nature of 
advice concerning legislative action, a function never conferred upon it by the Constitution, 
and against the exercise of which this court has steadily set its face from the beginning." 
219 U.S. 346 at 362, 31 S.Ct. 250 (1911). It can be argued that congressional action in 
granting immunity to a witness falls squarely within the language above quoted. 
43 See generally, on the investigative power, McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 
47 S.Ct. 319 (1927). 
44 This is the argument of the minority of the House Judiciary Committee when the 
bill was reported out. H. Rep. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (1954). 
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C. Substitution of Immunity for Constitutional Privilege. So long 
as the Brown case remains good law, the substitution of immunity for 
the Fifth Amendment privilege is constitutionally adequate. An argu-
ment based upon the reasonableness of the substitution alone would 
necessarily run afoul of that decision. Since the time it was handed 
down, the Court has tacitly approved it in cases where the issue might 
have been raised. 45 
D. Usurpation of Executive Pardoning Power. The argument 
based upon usurpation of the executive pardoning power, raised anew 
in the minority report of the House Judiciary Committee, seems also 
to be foreclosed by the Brown case.46 Some language in the dissenting 
opinion of Justice Frankfurter in United States v. Mania may give 
some small comfort to proponents of this argument. But that language 
may well have been used as a verbal means of reaching the particular 
end in that case.47 
These are believed to be the chief constitutional obstacles to the 
new act. Only the argument relating to separation of powers appears 
to be serious enough to merit a more thorough examination than is 
offered here. 
III. Some Problems of Construction 
One of the chief criticisms of the new act is the loose nature of its 
language. It will be recalled that while the language of former §3486 
covered only testimony before a congressional committee, the Witness 
Immunity Act applies to two different situations-both committee 
testimony and testimony before a grand jury or court of the United 
States. There is some contrast in the substance of these provisions. 
The approval of the attorney general is not a prerequisite to granting 
immunity to a witness before a committee. Where the testimony is 
45 See, e.g., United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 63 S.Ct. 409 (1943); Shapiro v. 
United States, 335 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 1375 (1948). 
46 It may be argued that a direct statutory grant of immunity, as in the case of the 
regulatory agencies, is distinguishable from the instant legislation, which necessitates a 
vote of the committee, and which is, in one sense, an immunity grant ail 1wc by that 
committee. But this appears to be chiefly a verbal quibble, as conditions are prescribed 
before immunity is forthcoming under either statute. 
47 In order to justify his view that the privilege against self-incrimination had to be 
claimed before the immunity could come into force, absent such a requisite in the statute, 
Justice Frankfurter argued that these statutes were not statutes of "general amnesty," but 
were aimed at the more efficient administration of criminal justice. 317 U.S. 424 at 436, 
63 S.Ct. 409 (1943). This terminology-that immunity legislation is aimed toward 
"amnesty"-was the rationale of the majority in Brown v. Walker when the usurpation-of-
pardoning-power argument was dealt with. 161 U.S. 591 at 601, 16 S.Ct. 644 (1896). 
But see Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 33 S.Ct. 226 (1913). 
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given in court or before a grand jury, the attorney general's approval 
is necessary, in addition to an order of "the court." (It may be ques-
tioned just which court the statute refers to in requiring an application 
to be made by the United States attorney. The section refers in part 
to grand jury proceedings and so there is no necessary implied specifi-
cation of the tribunal with jurisdiction in the premises.) In subsection 
(c), the provision relating to courts and grand juries, specific criminal 
statutes such as the Atomic Energy Act and Internal Security Act are 
spelled out, as bases for grants of immunity, in addition to the general 
grounds found in subsection (a), the congressional committee provi-
sion. Under these circumstances, the court may be faced with the 
problem of whether Congress by implication intended to exclude from 
the general area where immunity may be granted under subsection (a) 
the specific areas enumerated in subsection (c). The problem could 
be resolved by regarding the enumeration in subsection (c) as surplus-
age. At any rate, the difference in approach is puzzling. 
A more serious problem is presented by the procedure set up in 
subsections (a) and (b) for a congressional grant of immunity. It is 
evident that the district court is to participate in the grant, but the 
direction and degree of that participation is left somewhat uncertain.48 
Under subsection (a) an order "may be issued by a United States dis-
trict court judge" requiring the witness to give testimony. No criteria 
are specified upon which to condition such an order. Presumably, the 
judge must satisfy himself that the committee has recommended a 
grant of immunity and that application has been made for an order. 
It can be argued that a showing of materiality of the question asked to 
the investigation being carried on under the committee's authorization 
would also be a prerequisite to such an order. But nothing in the stat-
ute itself requires this conclusion.49 The problem involving separation 
of powers may thus be made more acute, since this subsection contem-
plates what seems to be a judicial (as contrasted with an administrative) 
act on the part of the district judge, for a court order not supplemen-
tary to a judicial proceeding would seem to be an anomaly. But if 
some element of controversy is introduced, e.g., the materiality of the 
questions asked, then the constitutional injunction should be satisfied. 
In subsection (b), it is provided that no immunity shall be granted 
without notification of the attorney general and the securing of "ap-
48 Debate on the House Hoor did not reveal any greater degree of certainty. 100 CoNG. 
REc. 12604 (Aug. 4, 1954). 
49 Query as to whether a court order under the statute would be conclusive on the 
witness as to the question of materiality if raised in a contempt proceeding. 
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proval from the United States district court for the district wherein 
such inquiry is being held." This requisite again lacks any clearcut 
criteria for the action of the district judge. It may be questioned 
whether his power is one of veto, going to the wisdom of the immunity 
grant, or whether it is a formal rubber-stamp, designed only to prevent 
hasty action by committees.50 There is also the possibility that the phras-
ing in subsection (b) is a mere repetition, in slightly different language, 
of the procedure set forth in subsection (a). The sentence succeeding 
the provision under discussion may aid the interpretation that the dis-
trict court is to exercise discretion as to the wisdom of the grant of 
immunity. It provides that the attorney general shall be given an 
opportunity to be heard with respect to the "proposed application" for 
the court's approval. If no latitude in regard to the wisdom of the 
grant resides in the court, then the attorney general's opportunity to 
be heard would be a rather empty one. It should also be noted that 
whereas in subsection (a) the district court judge is specified as the 
acting force, subsection (b) specifies the district court, apparently as 
a juridical entity. Should the statute be technically interpreted so as 
to emphasize this difference in terminology, then the constitutional 
bugaboo raised in Hayburn's Case (a court is being required to do 
an executive act) is somewhat more acute than if the judge were 
specified. 
There appears to be little change in substance from the type of 
law upheld in Brown v. Walker as to the necessary broadness of the 
immunity. The terminology seems largely to be taken from the regu-
latory statutes before discussed. 
A further serious interpretative problem relates to the decision in 
Adams v. Maryland.51 It must be remembered that that case involved 
a situation where state rules of practice (evidentiary in nature), and 
not the administration of local criminal law, were forced to bow to the 
supremacy clause of the federal Constitution. 52 Since the instant stat-
ute gives full immunity from prosecution (former §3486 prohibited 
only the use of testimony in any court), it is highly questionable 
whether the reasoning of the Adams case can be extended to its lan-
guage. This is so although the pivotal language of the former statute-
"No testimony ... shall be used as evidence in any criminal proceed-
ings against him in any court ... "-is repeated in substance in the 
50 For a similar doubt, see the remarks of Representative Reams, 100 CoNG. REc. 
12608 (Aug. 4, 1954). 
51347 U.S. 179, 74 S.Ct. 442 (1954). 
112cf. United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 52 S.Ct. 63 (1931). 
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new law, together with the full immunity provision. It may well be 
doubted that the national government has any power to grant -full 
immunity from prosecution of an individual under state law merely 
on the theory that such power is necessary as an incident to obtaining 
testimony before congressional committees. The supremacy clause is 
strong, but it does not go that far, because the effect of full immunity 
would be to nullify state criminal law in the substantive sense, even 
though state officers may base a prosecution on wholly independent 
evidence. It might be proper to construe the new statute to mean that 
evidentiary matters in state proceedings are controlled by the limitation 
on the use of compelled testimony given before a committee or grand 
jury, as decided in the Adams case, but that states are free to prosecute 
witnesses for crimes revealed in their testimony if the evidence relied 
upon is independent. 'The exact language of the statute, with the testi-
monial provision in a clause separate from the full immunity provision, 
gives weight to this thesis. However, there must remain some doubt on 
_ the matter until the Court has spoken.53 
One more problem, chiefly a practical one, should be noted. The 
language of the statute permits a grant of immunity as to the "transac-
tions, matters, or things concerning which he is compelled" to testify. 
The witness, as has been seen, must claim his privilege in response to 
questions before committee action may be taken to grant immunity. 
But nothing is directly provided as to the relevancy of his response 
after immunity has been granted. Perhaps it may be presumed that in 
later criminal proceedings a court may determine whether the revela-
tion made by the defendant before a committee was germane to the 
question or questions asked. But the statute might have been made 
clear in this regard. Lack of express language in the act led some law-
makers to voice fears of a repetition of the "immunity baths" under the 
- 1857 statute.54 
It may be stated, in conclusion, that the Witness Immunity Act of 
1954 needs definitive interpretation by the courts before either com-
mittees or witnesses can safely operate under it. The vague language 
employed as to the district court's part in the immunity grant is sus-
ceptible of varying interpretations. So is the scope of the immunity 
53 See the testimony of the Chicago Bar Association, quoted in the minority report of 
H. Rep. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 14 (1954). 
54 See remarks of Senator Kefauver: "The bill does not set out affirmatively that the 
response must be germane to the question, and many of the feai:s expressed by the Senator 
from Oklahoma [Mr. Monroney] might be well founded in the granting of immunity to a 
dangerous criminal." 99 CoNG. R.Ec. 8349 (1953). 
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grant itself in its relation to state criminal prosecutions. The narrow 
field the statute embraces will at least limit the impact of the legislation 
on congressional investigations and federal criminal proceedings.'"' 
George S. Flint, S.Ed. 
55 Constitutionality of the grand jw:y provisions [subsection (c)] of the statute here 
discussed was upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the case of 
William Ludwig Ullman, N.Y. TIMES, April 5, 1955, p. 1:3. Appeal from this decision 
is likely. Justices Frank, Clark, and Galston wrote separate opinions upholding the district 
court decision holding Ullman in contempt after immunity had been granted and he con-
tinued to refuse to answer certain questions, 23 LAW WEEK 2393 (Jan. 31, 1955). The 
court refused to adopt defendant's theory that the purpose of granting immunity was to 
entrap him into a perjury charge. But all three judges e."\:l)ressed doubt as to the continued 
soundness of the settled Supreme Court rule upholding such statutes, as first enunciated 
in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 16 S.Ct. 644 (1896). Clark, C.J., concurring, said: 
''I concur but regretfully. For the steady and now precipitate erosion of the Fifth Amend-
ment seems to me to have gone far beyond anything within the conception of those 
Justices of the Supreme Court who by the narrowest of margins gave support to the trend 
in the Eighteen Nineties." The more serious problems connected with subsections (a) 
and (b), relating to testimony before congressional committees, were of course not involved 
in this decision. 
